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Abstract: Previous results on the relation between risk and investment are mixed, partly due to 
endogeneity. To alleviate the effects of this bias, we adopt a generalized method of 
moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator to investigate the relation. We find that the 
puzzling positive sensitivity of investment (i.e. firm’s investment rate) to systematic risk as 
frequently documented in previous studies disappears. Further, we show that the more 
irreversible the firm’s investments are, the more valuable is the option to delay 
investment when risk is high, which supports the model with irreversible investment. 
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1.  Introduction 
The relation between risk and investment has been an important research topic for several 
decades. Despite an extensive theoretical literature predicting a negative impact of risk on 
investment (e.g., Bernanke (1983); Smith and Stulz (1985); McDonald and Siegel (1986); Froot et al. 
(1993); Dixit and Pindyck (1994); Abel and Eberly (1996)), empirical results are mixed.  While some 
studies support the theoretical prediction (e.g., Leahy and Whited (1996); Gulen and Ion (2016); 
Julio and Yook (2012)), Bulan (2005) and Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) show that idiosyncratic 
and systematic risk affect investment in different ways. In particular, they find that systematic risk 
actually encourages investment while idiosyncratic risk does the opposite. One goal of this paper 
is to reconcile these mixed empirical results. 
We start by examining the average relation between risk and investment (i.e. firm’s investment rate) 
using the conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) model with fixed effects. We confirm that an 
increase in idiosyncratic volatility depresses investment, while an increase in systematic volatility 
encourages investment. 
Since systematic volatility depends on the firm’s systematic risk exposure (beta) as well as market 
and industry risk, we further decompose systematic volatility into its individual components to 
examine the role of covariance and other components. Surprisingly, we find that a firm’s exposure 
to systematic risk is positively correlated with investment. The result stands in contrast with the view 
that greater systematic risk tends to make investment less desirable. 
We acknowledge that the OLS model may give rise to three potential sources of endogeneity. First, 
the OLS model ignores unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that neither the risk variables nor the 
control variables are correlated to unobserved firm characteristics. Second, OLS estimation relies 
on the assumption that none of the risk variables or the control variables is correlated with the error 
term. But if investment and risk are simultaneously determined, then this assumption is clearly 
violated, which leads to biased OLS estimates. 
Lastly, although the fixed-effects estimation eliminates unobserved heterogeneity, it potentially 
introduces dynamic endogeneity. The fixed-effects estimation relies on a strict exogeneity 
assumption which requires that in our context, the risk variables we observe today are completely 
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independent of any past, present and future investment. This assumption is likely to be violated if 
contemporaneous risk variables depend on past realization of investment, and thus fixed-effects 
estimation is likely to be inconsistent. 
While there is substantial economic justification to suspect that the risk variables are not strictly 
exogenous, we confirm this with an econometric test of strict exogeneity suggested by Wooldridge 
(2010). The results show the risk variables are not strictly exogenous. Thus, dynamic endogeneity is 
likely to be a major source of bias in the baseline model. 
Consistent estimation of the relation between risk and investment requires the use of an estimation 
technique which controls for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity while exploiting the 
dynamic association between risk and investment. A promising estimation technique is the GMM 
dynamic panel estimator. This estimator, first proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
provides an excellent econometric specification to deal with the abovementioned issues.  
When the estimation is carried out using the GMM dynamic panel estimator, the puzzling positive 
sensitivity of investment to systematic risk disappears. We further apply the GMM estimator to 
estimate the relation between investment and various components of systematic risk and 
document a clear negative response of investment to systematic risk components. These results 
support the prediction that the greater the systematic risk the less the incentive to invest.  
Both the traditional view (e.g. the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)) and the real option theory 
predict that greater uncertainty tends to make investment less desirable. However, the traditional 
view asserts that it is only the systematic risk that should matter for firm investment, while real option 
theory predicts that it is the total risk that should matter for investment. To this point, our GMM 
estimations show that both systematic and idiosyncratic risk have negative impacts on firm 
investment. Therefore, we take the next step to examine the predictions of real option theory in the 
context of capital irreversibility.  
The ability to delay investment is valuable when the investment is irreversible, and the future is 
uncertain. The irreversibility of investment stems from capital specificity at the industry and/or at the 
firm level. We implement sample splits according to the firm’s degree of irreversibility and re-
estimate the relation between investment and risk using a GMM dynamic panel estimator in the 
two subsamples. We provide empirical support for the prediction of real options models that the 
more irreversible the firm’s investments are, the more valuable is the option to delay investment 
when risk is high. 
The main contribution of this paper is to reconcile mixed evidence on the relation between risk and 
investment. Prior studies documenting a puzzling positive sensitivity of investment to systematic 
volatility may have inadvertently relied on inconsistent estimation procedures. By implementing a 
GMM dynamic panel estimator that eliminates the major sources of endogeneity, we show that the 
positive sign is replaced by a negative relation between investment and systematic risk. 
This paper also contributes to the literature that uses the GMM dynamic panel estimation in 
economics and finance where unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity are 
prevalent and truly exogenous instruments are difficult to find. Examples of these studies include 
Caselli et al. (1996), Blundell and Bond (1998), Beck et al. (2000), Erickson and Whited (2000) and 
Wintoki et al. (2012). In estimating the relation between investment and risk, we apply the GMM 
dynamic panel estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity. 
In addition, this paper provides empirical support for the prediction of real options models. Our 
results show that the greater the degree of asset-specificity of capital (and hence the more 
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irreversible the firm’s investments are), the more valuable is the option to delay investment when 
uncertainty is high. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample. Section 3 
provides empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Sample 
Following previous empirical work in the risk and investment literature, the sample includes all 
publicly traded firms in Compustat over the period 1970 to 2005, excluding firms in the financial (SIC 
code 6000−6999), utilities (SIC code 4900−4949), and government-regulated industries (SIC code > 
9000). Firm-year observations with missing SIC codes, with missing values for investment, Tobin’s Q, 
cash flows, size, leverage, stock returns, and with negative book values of capital are dropped. 
Firms with fewer than 40 weekly observations in that year are also excluded. The initial sample 
includes a total of 101,378 firm-year observations. Finally, data are winsorized by year at the 0.5% 
and 99.5% levels in all specifications. Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Investment rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ) is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure to book assets. Our measure of idiosyncratic 
risk, log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), is constructed from a regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding 
industry portfolio. Systematic volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)) is defined as the (log of the) square root of the difference between the 
firm’s total variance and its idiosyncratic variance. Market volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)) is defined as the (log of the) square root of 
the variance of CRSP VW index. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are coefficient estimates from the regression of weekly firm-level returns on 
the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Industry volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) defined as the (log of the) square 
root of the variance of VW industry portfolio. The sample period is 1970 to 2005. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N=101,378) 
Variables     Mean Std Dev 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  0.071 0.078 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) –0.959 0.545 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) –1.949 0.735 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕) –2.045 0.332 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕  0.591 1.307 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) –1.742 0.354 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  0.374 0.998 
Panel B: Sample Correlations (N=101,378) 
Variables     𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕) 𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕  𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) 𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  1       
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) -0.096 1      
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) 0.019 0.384 1     
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕) -0.038 0.186 0.342 1    
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕  0.002 0.114 0.217 0.005 1   
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) -0.055 0.274 0.389 0.776 0.008 1  
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  0.036 -0.051 0.214 -0.012 -0.767 0.016 1 
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Baseline Model 
 
In this section, we use the OLS model with fixed-effects as the baseline model to examine the 
response of investment to idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. 
 
The baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility is constructed using weekly data on stock returns 
from CRSP (Bulan (2005), Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)).  For every firm i and every year t, we 
regress the firm’s return on the value-weighted market portfolio,𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, and on the corresponding 
value-weighted industry portfolio, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , based on the (Fama & French 1997) 30-industry 
classification, across the 52 weekly observations. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼1,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝜏𝜏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 ,                                          (1) 
where 𝜏𝜏 indexes weeks. Then idiosyncratic risk is the log volatility of the regression residuals 
 log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = log�∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏2𝜏𝜏∈𝑡𝑡  .                                                       (2) 
Systematic volatility is then defined as the (log of the) square root of the difference between the 
firm’s total variance and its idiosyncratic variance. 
 
The response of investment to idiosyncratic and systematic risk is estimated using the following 
equation:   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛽𝛽1 log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽2 log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,              (3) 
where the dependent variable is the firm’s investment rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ) and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  is a vector of 
control variables: (i) log Tobin’s Q; (ii) the ratio of cash flows to assets (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2)⁄ ; (iii) log firm size; 
(iv) the firm’s own stock return (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1); and (v) log firm leverage, measured as the ratio of equity to 
assets (log(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ )). Depending on the specification, we include firm (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖) or year dummies (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡). 
Finally, the errors (𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) are clustered at the firm level. 
 
The estimates of Equation (3) are reported in the first column of Table 2. The coefficient on 
idiosyncratic volatility is of –1% and statistically significant. The sign of the coefficient is consistent 
with Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), but the magnitude is smaller due to the reason that we use 
book assets instead of replacement value of capital (see, Salinger and Summers (1983)) in the 
dependent variable in Equation (3). However, the coefficient on systematic volatility is positive and 
significant (0.2%). The positive sensitivity of investment to systematic volatility is puzzling.  All else 
equal, an increase in systematic volatility increases the firms’ cost of capital and therefore should 
decrease investment. 
 
Since the measure of systematic volatility depends on the firm’s systematic risk exposure (beta) as 
well as the amount of market and industry risk, we decide to decompose systematic volatility into 
individual components in an attempt to explain the positive response of investment to systematic 
volatility. 
 
  
 
 
6 
 
THE EFFECT OF RISK ON INVESTMENT: NEW EVIDENCE 
Table 2: Baseline OLS model of investment on risk 
The table reports OLS estimation results of Equations (3) and (4), where the dependent variable is the investment rate 
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ). The idiosyncratic risk, log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), is constructed from a regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW 
index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Systematic volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)) defined as the (log of the) square root of the 
difference between the firm’s total variance and its idiosyncratic variance. Market volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)) is defined as the (log 
of the) square root of the variance of CRSP VW index. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are coefficient estimates from the regression of weekly 
firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Industry volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) defined as the 
(log of the) square root of the variance of VW industry portfolio. Financial control variables include lagged values of: Tobin’s 
Q log(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1) defined as in Fazzari et al. (1988); operating cash flows (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2⁄ ) defined as the ratio of operating income to 
book assets; the firm’s size (log(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1)) defined as the log value of book assets; the firm’s stock return (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1); leverage (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ) 
defined as the ratio of book equity to book assets. The coefficients of these control variables are suppressed for brevity. The 
sample period is 1970 to 2005. F, T denotes firm and time fixed effects, and 𝐶𝐶-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  1 2 3 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) –0.010*** –0.002*** –0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) 0.002***   
 (0.000)   
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕)  –0.001 –0.034*** 
  (0.589) (0.000) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕   0.003*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊)  –0.011*** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.704) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊   0.002*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.004) 
Financial controls Yes No Yes 
Observations 101,378 101,378 101,378 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 0.555 0.494 0.555 
Fixed effects F,T F F,T 
 
We estimate the response of investment to each component of systematic volatility and 
idiosyncratic risk using the following reduced-form equation:  
   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛾𝛾2 log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾3𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾4 log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾5𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾6𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                             
(4) 
 
where four additional regressors are included: market volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)) defined as the (log of the) 
square root of the variance of CRSP VW index; 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are coefficient estimates from the 
regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry 
portfolio in Equation (1); industry volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) defined as the (log of the) square root of the 
variance of VW industry portfolio. 
 
The second and third column in Table 2 present estimates of Equation (4). In the second column, 
the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is negative and significant (–0.2%); the coefficients on 
systematic risk exposure (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) are positive and significant whereas the coefficients on 
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market and industry risk are negative (only the coefficient on industry risk is significant). The last 
column presents the results of the benchmark estimation for Equation (4). The coefficient on 
idiosyncratic volatility stays negative and significant. The coefficient on market risk is negative and 
significant whereas the coefficient on industry risk is positive but insignificant. Invariably, the 
coefficients on systematic risk exposure (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) are positive and significant. 
 
Our estimates are consistent with Bloom (2009), who finds a negative relation between investment 
and the volatility of the market portfolio. Nevertheless, the positive response of investment to a firm’s 
exposure to systematic risk remains puzzling. 
 
 
3.2. Testing for Strict Exogeneity 
 
To investigate the puzzling positive sensitivity of investment to systematic risk, we need to realize that 
three potential sources of endogeneity may arise from estimating Equation (3) and (4) using the 
baseline model. Firstly, the OLS model ignores unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that neither 
the risk variables nor the control variables are correlated with unobserved firm characteristics. But it 
is quite easy to see that this assumption is likely to be violated when estimating the relation between 
investment and risk. For example, a firm’ growth opportunity not only has a direct impact on 
investment but is also likely to be correlated with the firm’s exposure to systematic risk. This suggests 
that OLS estimates are likely to be severely biased. 
 
Aside from unobserved heterogeneity, OLS estimation relies on the assumption that neither the risk 
variables nor the control variables are correlated with the error term, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. If investment and risk are 
simultaneously determined, then this assumption is clearly violated, and OLS yields biased estimates. 
 
Lastly, although the fixed-effects estimation employed in the previous section eliminates the 
unobserved heterogeneity, it potentially introduces dynamic endogeneity. The fixed-effects 
estimation relies on a strict exogeneity assumption which implies that, in our context the risk variables 
that we observe today is completely independent of any past, present and future investment. This 
assumption is likely to be violated if there is a dynamic relation between firms’ investment and risk, 
and thus fixed-effects estimation is likely to be inconsistent. 
 
While there is substantial economic justification to suspect that the risk variables are not strictly 
exogenous, we need to confirm this with an econometric test of strict exogeneity. 
 
Wooldridge (2010) present a regression-based test for strict exogeneity that is relatively easy to 
implement. If 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 contains the explanatory variables, a test of strict exogeneity is obtained by 
carrying out fixed-effects estimation on the equation: 
   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                   (5) 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is a forward subset of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. 𝑋𝑋 includes idiosyncratic and systematic risk, market volatility 
( log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) ), 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and industry volatility ( log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ). Under the null hypothesis of strict 
exogeneity, γ = 0. Intuitively, if γ≠ 0, then current risk measures depend on past investment rate (or 
conversely, present investment affects firm’s future risk). Thus, if we can reject the hypothesis, then 
fixed-effects estimation is likely to be biased by the presence of dynamic endogeneity and we are 
likely to obtain less biased and more consistent estimates using a dynamic estimation procedure. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (5), with different subsets of the risk variables, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1. In every specification in which they are included, the coefficient estimates for the forward 
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values of idiosyncratic and systematic risk, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are significantly different from zero. This 
suggests that none of these risk variables are strictly exogenous and all of these variables adjust to 
firm investment.  
 
Table 3: Tests of strict exogeneity 
The table reports fixed-effects estimation results of Equation (5), where the dependent variable is the investment rate 
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ). Explanatory variables include idiosyncratic risk (log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )), systematic risk (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)), market volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)), 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , industry volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) and forward values of these risk variables. Financial control variables include lagged 
values of: Tobin’s Q log(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1), operating cash flows (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2⁄ ), the firm’s size (log(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1)), the firm’s stock return (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1) and 
leverage (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ). The definitions of these variables are the same as in Table 2. The coefficients of these control variables 
are suppressed for brevity. The sample period is 1970 to 2005. F, T denotes firm and time fixed effects, and 𝐶𝐶-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  1 2 3 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) –0.010*** –0.004*** –0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) 0.002***   
 (0.000)   
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕)  –0.002 –0.001 
  (0.226) (0.903) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕   0.003*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊)  –0.015*** –0.003* 
  (0.000) (0.091) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊   0.003*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.009) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) –0.011*** –0.013*** –0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) 0.006***   
 (0.000)   
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕   0.006*** 0.004*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊   0.008*** 0.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial controls Yes No Yes 
Observations 101,378 101,378 101,378 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐 0.560 0.490 0.560 
Fixed effects F,T F F,T 
 
Overall, the results from Table 3 suggest the risk variables are not strictly exogenous. Thus, dynamic 
endogeneity is likely to be a major source of bias in estimating the relation between investment and 
risk. 
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3.3. Estimating the Relation between Investment and Risk using a GMM Dynamic Panel 
Estimator 
 
Consistent estimation of Equations (3) and (4) requires the use of an estimation technique which 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity while exploiting the dynamic association 
between risk and investment. 
 
An appealing estimation technique is the GMM dynamic panel estimator. This estimator, first 
proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), provides an excellent econometric 
framework for dealing with the endogeneity issues. Moreover, as Nickell (1981) shows, when 
estimating a dynamic panel data, a bias arises in the “small T, large N” context. Our sample has a 
time dimension(𝑇𝑇 = 36) and a large firm dimension (𝑁𝑁 = 2,816). GMM dynamic panel estimator is 
designed for small-T large-N panels. 
 
The dynamic GMM estimator replaces the strict exogeneity assumption with a weaker form of 
exogeneity, sequential exogeneity. The sequential exogeneity assumption allows the risk variables 
to be determined by past and present realizations of investment, but not future values. This is a fairly 
reasonable assumption. 
 
This assumption implies that the risk/investment relation should be treated as a dynamic unobserved 
effects model and Equations (2) and (3) should be estimated as: 
   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼𝛼 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2⁄ ) + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                        (6) 
Where X includes idiosyncratic and systematic risk, market volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)), 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 
industry volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)). 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a first difference GMM estimator by transforming e 
Equation (6) into a system of T-1 equations in first differences: 
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 = ∆𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖                                                         (7) 
 
 
Where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  includes the risk variables, control variables and lagged investment rates. This step 
eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to have a model where our risk variables 
can be arbitrarily correlated with any unobserved firm characteristics. 
 
As Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out, we can improve the GMM 
estimator by including the equations in levels in the estimation procedure. We can use the first-
differenced variables as instruments for the equations in levels. This will produce a system GMM 
estimator. The system GMM estimator enables us to obtain efficient estimates while maintaining all 
the essential elements of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity. 
 
The basic steps underlying this estimation strategy is as follows. First, the regression equation of 
investment on risk is written as a dynamic model that includes lagged investment as an explanatory 
variable. Next, we can take first-difference and carry out GMM estimation using lagged values of 
the risk, as well as lagged values of investment as GMM instruments. 
 
Table 4 presents the GMM dynamic panel estimator of investment on risk. We report the results in 
the same order as in Table 2. The first column reports the GMM estimation of investment on 
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idiosyncratic and systematic risk. The coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility remains statistically 
negative (–0.5%). However, the positive sign on systematic volatility has disappeared, instead, the 
coefficient on systematic volatility is negative (–0.1%) and statistically significant. Columns 2 and 3 
present the results of investment on various components of systematic volatility. The coefficients on 
systematic risk exposure (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) are all negative: the coefficients on 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are significant in 
both columns and the coefficients on 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  statistically significant in column 3.  
 
Table 4: GMM dynamic panel estimator of investment on risk 
The table reports the GMM dynamic panel estimator of investment on risk, where the dependent variable is the investment 
rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ). Our measure of idiosyncratic risk, log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), is constructed from a regression of weekly firm-level returns on 
the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Systematic volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)) is defined as the (log of the) 
square root of the difference between the firm’s total variance and its idiosyncratic variance. Market volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)) is 
defined as the (log of the) square root of the variance of CRSP VW index. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are coefficient estimates from the 
regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Industry volatility 
(log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) defined as the (log of the) square root of the variance of VW industry portfolio. Financial control variables include 
lagged values of the investment rate (𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1)⁄ ), lagged values of: Tobin’s Q log(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1) defined as in Fazzari et al. (1988); 
operating cash flows (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2⁄ ) defined as the ratio of operating income to book assets; the firm’s size (log(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1)) defined 
as the log value of book assets; the firm’s stock return (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1); leverage (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ) defined as the ratio of book equity to book 
assets. The coefficients of these control variables are suppressed for brevity. The sample period is 1970 to 2005. F denotes 
firm fixed effects, T denotes time fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level, and 𝐶𝐶-values are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  1 2 3 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) –0.005*** –0.003** –0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) –0.001**   
 (0.021)   
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕)  0.001 –0.005*** 
  (0.818) (0.006) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕   –0.001 –0.002*** 
  (0.116) (0.000) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊)  –0.008*** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.775) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊   –0.002*** –0.003*** 
  (0.003) (0.000) 
Financial controls Yes No Yes 
Observations 83,687 91,686 83,687 
Significance level (𝑪𝑪-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
The puzzling positive sensitivity of investment to systematic volatility documented in the baseline OLS 
model has been eliminated with the implementation of the GMM dynamic panel estimator. These 
results clearly support the hypothesis that the greater the systematic risk the less the incentive to 
invest. The application of the GMM dynamic panel estimator removes the major sources of 
endogeneity inherent in the estimation of the relation between risk and investment and thus enable 
us to reconcile the mixed results from prior studies. 
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3.4 Sample Splits 
 
Although both assume a negative investment-risk relation, the traditional view (e.g. market 
uncertainty under the CAPM) states that it is only the systematic risk that should matter for firm 
investment; real option theory predicts, on the other hand, that it is total risk that should matter for 
firm investment. Our results in Table 4 show that both systematic and idiosyncratic risk matter for 
investment. Therefore, in this section we attempt to examine the predictions of real option models 
to differences in the irreversibility of capital. 
 
Table 5: GMM dynamic panel estimator of investment on risk by asset specificity 
The table reports the GMM dynamic panel estimator of investment on risk, where the dependent variable is the investment 
rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ). The sample is split into high vs. low asset specificity subsamples. Asset specificity is the ratio of machinery 
and equipment to total assets. High (low) asset specificity subsamples are comprised of the firms whose asset specificity is 
above (below) the sample median at the three-digit SIC industry level. Our measure of idiosyncratic risk,  log(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), is 
constructed from a regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. 
Systematic volatility (log(𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)) is defined as the (log of the) square root of the difference between the firm’s total variance 
and its idiosyncratic variance. Market volatility (𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) is defined as the square root of the variance of CRSP VW index. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  
and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are coefficient estimates from the regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the 
corresponding industry portfolio. Industry volatility (𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) defined as the square root of the variance of VW industry portfolio. 
Financial control variables include lagged values of the investment rate (𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1)⁄ ), lagged values of: Tobin’s Q log(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1) defined as in Fazzari et al. (1988); operating cash flows (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−2⁄ ) defined as the ratio of operating income to 
book assets; the firm’s size (log(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1)) defined as the log value of book assets; the firm’s stock return (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1); leverage (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ) 
defined as the ratio of book equity to book assets. The coefficients of these control variables are suppressed for brevity. The 
sample period is 1970 to 2005. F denotes firm fixed effects, T denotes time fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level, and 𝐶𝐶-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 High asset specificity Low asset specificity 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏⁄  1 2 3 4 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) –0.0024* –0.0026** –0.0010 –0.0016 
 ( 0.056) ( 0.026 ) (0.545) (0.300) 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕) –0.0003**  –0.0009  
 ( 0.047 )  (0.260)  
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕 𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕  –0.0005**  0.0005 
  ( 0.019 )  (0.247) 
𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊   –0.0006**  0.0001 
  ( 0.011)  (0.774) 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,684 13,684 14,240 14,240 
Significance level (𝑪𝑪-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
The ability to delay investment is valuable when the investment is irreversible, and the future is 
uncertain. The irreversibility of investment expenditures stems from capital specificity at the industry 
and/or at the firm level. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that the irreversibility of capital is more 
pronounced at the industry level because capital is industry-specific. 
 
We split the sample according to the firm’s degree of irreversibility and re-estimate the relation 
between investment and risk using a GMM dynamic panel estimator in two subsamples. We 
measure a firm’s degree of irreversibility using the asset specificity. As in Klasa et al. (2018) and Valta 
(2012), we compute asset specificity as the ratio of machinery and equipment to book assets. Then 
the sample is split into high vs. low asset specificity subsamples, where high (low) asset specificity 
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subsamples are the firms whose asset specificity is above (below) the sample median at the three-
digit SIC industry level. 
 
The results are presented in Table 5. The coefficients on both market and industry risk are significantly 
negative for irreversible (high asset specificity) firms while the coefficients are insignificant for 
reversible (low asset specificity) firms. These findings are consistent with real option behaviour when 
capital is industry-specific. The results on firm-specific risk show a similar pattern: the coefficients are 
significantly negative for the irreversible subsample but insignificant for the reversible sample. 
Overall, the main finding is that the greater the degree of asset-specificity of capital (and hence 
the more irreversible the firm’s investments are), the more valuable is the option to delay investment 
when uncertainty is high. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Despite a vast theoretical literature that predicts an increase in risk should depress investment, the 
existing empirical results have been mixed. We recognize that three potential sources of 
inconsistency may arise when estimating the relation: unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity. In an attempt to address these concerns, we use a GMM dynamic panel 
estimator. Results show that the puzzling positive sensitivity of investment to systematic risk 
documented in the OLS model has been replaced with a negative relation between investment 
and systematic risk which supports the hypothesis that the greater the systematic risk the less the 
incentive to invest. We also provide empirical support for the prediction of real options models with 
irreversible investment. 
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